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Abstract: The integration of China into the global economy is one of the most spec-
tacular events in economic history. This paper investigates to what extent this process 
affects output growth and inflation in the advanced countries. A GVAR model is speci-
fied to explore interdependencies between business cycles in China and industrial 
countries, including the US, the euro area and Japan. For robustness, the results are 
compared to those obtained from leading structural models, such as NiGEM and OEF. 
Evidence is based on the responses to a Chinese demand shock arising from the recent 
fiscal stimulus program. The results show that the impact on output growth in the ad-
vanced economies can be quite substantial, especially for the Asian region. The expan-
sionary effects in the US and the euro area responses are lower, as trade linkages are 
less intensive. The multipliers are also reduced by a sizeable effect on inflation, as Chi-
nese firms participate in international production chains. 
JEL: E32, F15, C51 
Keywords: GVAR, Chinese economy, shock transmission
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The integration of China into the world economy has been one of the most spectacular 
events in economic history. In only three decades, China transformed from a closed and 
agricultural country to the second largest economy in the world, with a share of about 
10 percent of global GDP in PPPs. The industrialized world has benefitted from the 
development due to manufactured and intermediate products at lower costs and new 
markets. For example, China absorbs more than 10 percent of the exports from the ad-
vanced countries, after 5.5 percent at the turn of the century. Trade intensity measures 
suggest that China is already well integrated into the world economy (Bussière and 
Schnatz, 2006). At the same time, concerns have increased as the manufacturing and 
labour intensive industries have gone under high competition in the advanced econo-
mies, further intensified by exchange rate pressures. These reservations have gained 
importance as unemployment has risen in many countries during the last recession. Al-
though the global imbalances have declined since then, they are still striking and pick 
up again (Feldstein, 2011). 
The rising weight of China in the world economy may affect the macroeconomic devel-
opment in the industrial countries. For example, the integration can lead to a higher di-
vergence of business cycles between emerging and the advanced countries, i.e. stronger 
decoupling. In that case, the global economy would become more resistant against 
shocks arising from the advanced economies. However, these effects should not be ex-
aggerated. As the global financial crisis have shown, emerging markets remain highly 
vulnerable to the evolution of the advanced economies. After initial decoupling, global 
economic activity became temporarily highly synchronized in the second half of 2008. 
This does not constitute evidence against the decoupling hypothesis per se: the magni-
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 tude of the shock has been unprecedented by historical standards and may hide more 
positive secular trends. Despite this argument, the economic recovery has been charac-
terized by a revival of the decoupling hypothesis, i.e. huge growth divergencies across 
countries, with a strong increase in output in China and some other emerging markets 
and modest growth in major industrial states. The policy implications from a coupling 
or decoupling of national business cycles are manifold. A trend towards decoupling can 
reduce the risk of protectionism. The integration of China could have also impacts on 
the group of industrial economies. For example, it could allow the US and the euro area 
to synchronize their cycles less closely. In that case, a slowdown in the US would be 
less harmful for the euro area. 
The degree of comovement of economic activity across countries has been explored by 
numerous studies. However, the literature did not arrive at robust conclusions and the 
evidence is limited to the period before the financial crisis. Hence, the issue is still an 
open area of research. Most papers have looked on business cycle dynamics across ad-
vanced countries and particular regions. Stock and Watson (2005) concluded from their 
analysis that output comovement for the G7 countries has fallen over the 1984–2002 
period relative to 1960–83, most likely due to the absence of common shocks. Accord-
ing to Artis and Zhang (1997) and Artis, Krolzig and Toro (2004) a common component 
affects the cyclical evolution in the euro area countries. Sato and Zhang (2006) and Shin 
and Sohn (2006) reported evidence for business cycle convergence in East Asia, proba-
bly driven by trade integration. 
Only a few papers have extended the scope of the analysis to explore patterns between 
industrial and emerging markets. Following Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008), business 
cycles have converged among the groups of advanced and emerging market economies, 
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 respectively. Since the relevance of the global factor has declined, there is cyclical con-
vergence within each group, but divergence between them. Globalization did not change 
the degree of the pattern of international synchronization because the joint contribution 
of the global and group-specific factors has been rather stable over time. While common 
components play a larger role for business cycles in the group of advanced economies, 
country specific factors are more important for the emerging markets (Kose, Otrok and 
Whiteman, 2003). One rationale for this finding might be that many emerging countries 
have reached only intermediate levels of financial integration, i.e. they are not able to 
improve risk sharing opportunities (Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2007). The high savings 
rate in China of almost 50 percent may be interpreted as an indication of poorly devel-
oped financial markets. 
The Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008) finding of a low correlation of business cycles be-
tween emerging and industrial countries is at odds with Frankel and Rose (1998). Espe-
cially China has substantial trade linkages to major developed states. According to 
Fidrmuc, Korhonen and Bátorová (2008) there is little evidence for comovement be-
tween industrial countries and China at business cycle frequencies, as many correlations 
are negative. However, the ties are positive in the very short run, in line with strong 
relationships between suppliers in China and final producers in the developed countries. 
Hence, the result might reflect vertical trade specialization, especially for intermediate 
products. In a different vein, Pula and Peltonen (2009) emphasized that trade statistics 
overestimate the level of integration that actually takes place, because of multiple count-
ing of products in fragmented production processes. 
To explore the interdependencies, most authors looked on static and dynamic bivariate 
correlations of the cyclical components of output and the ability of global or regional 
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 factors to explain national business cycles. This paper takes a different route and speci-
fies a global VAR (GVAR) model to investigate the impact of a Chinese demand shock 
on GDP growth and inflation in industrial countries, including the US, the euro area and 
Japan. The recent fiscal stimulus package is considered as an example. For robustness, 
the results are compared to those obtained by leading structural macroeconometric 
models, such as NiGEM and OEF. The results demonstrate that the impact on output 
growth in the advanced economies is quite substantial, especially for the Asian region. 
The expansionary effects in the US and the euro area responses are lower, as trade link-
ages are less intensive. The multipliers are also reduced by a sizeable effect on inflation, 
as Chinese firms participate in international production chains. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section (Section 2) presents the 
Chinese fiscal stimulus program as an example for a huge demand shock. Afterwards 
the econometric tools are dicscussed. They include global VAR (Section 3) and struc-
tural macroeconometric models (Section 4). Section 5 holds the results. Finally, Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2  China’s fiscal stimulus package 
Despite clear signals of a recession in industrial countries, China experienced high out-
put growth in the first period of the financial crisis. However, after the collapse of the 
Lehman bank, GDP growth decreased markedly as major export markets deteriorated. 
Thousands of firms closed down especially in the export-oriented coastal areas and mil-
lions of workers lost their jobs from one day to the other. A deceleration of growth is a 
matter of concern for several reasons. According to many observers, an annual rate of 8 
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 percent of output growth is the minimum level to generate enough jobs for the smooth 
integration of labour migrants into the workforce and to avoid social unrest that can 
otherwise destabilize the country. Furthermore, high growth is a way of papering over 
weaknesses of the economy and provides one of the best instruments for solving struc-
tural problems (Prasad, 2007). 
It is against this backround that the Chinese government decided to launch a fiscal sti-
mulus package of 3.1 and 2.7 percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
The package includes higher investment in infrastructure in rural areas and large scaled 
projects like railroads, roads and airports and to a minor extent measures to improve the 
livelihood of the people, such as a stronger social safety net, the construction of low rent 
housing, better quality of public healthcare and education. See Naughton (2009) for a 
breakdown of individual expenditures. 
The package may lead to a higher path of private consumption as precautionary savings 
are reduced. The decrease of public social transfers is often seen as a factor behind the 
decline of the consumption to GDP ratio in the pre-crisis period. Private households had 
to save more to finance future expenditures on health, old age consumption and educa-
tion (Baldacci, Callegari, Coady, Ding, Kumar, Tommasino and Woo, 2010). The pack-
age does not reverse the export- and investment led growth strategy (Xu, 2010). Strate-
gic export oriented industries are further supported in the next five year plan. But a 
more balanced path of the expansion is planned, putting higher weight on domestic de-
mand and the production of non-tradables and services. Therefore, China could become 
less vulnerable against global shocks. 
The fiscal stimulus appears to be successful at first sight. China recovered from the cri-
sis quickly and the economy continued to rise at high rates. According to the input out-
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 put analysis presented by He, Zhang and Zhang (2009) the fiscal multiplier is slightly 
about 0.8 in the short run and increases to 1.1 in the medium run. The package can po-
tentially generate up to 20 million new jobs in the non-farming sectors. In addition, the 
simulation evidence provided by Cova, Pisani and Rebucci (2010) points to strong posi-
tive effects. About 2.5 percentage points of the recent growth experience might be at-
tributed to the stimulus. Taken these results for granted, lower growth rates should be 
expected for the period ahead, since the measures will not be prolonged indefinitely. 
Despite the impact on the Chinese economy, other countries might be affected. Trig-
gered by higher GDP growth imports will also accelerate, implying better export oppor-
tunities for the rest of the world. 
 
3  Global VAR models 
Global VAR (GVAR) models provide a convenient framework to explore international 
transmission mechanisms. The model is based on VARs for N+1 countries, see Pesaran, 
Schuermann and Weiner (2004) and Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin (2006). The country 
specific models are linked as foreign variables are allowed to enter the equations. Due 




01 , 1 0 1 , 1 it i i i i t i it i i t it x aa t x x x u −− = + +Φ +Λ +Λ +  
i is the country index and t denotes time. Furthermore xit is a vector of ki domestic vari-
ables, and x
*
it a vector with k
*
i country specific foreign variables, i.e. constructed by a 
weighting scheme relevant for the particular country. The system might be extended by 
common factors representing global variables such as oil prices. In addition, Φi is a kixki 
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 matrix of coefficients for the lagged domestic variables, and Λi0 and Λi1 are kixk
*
i matri-
ces associated with the coefficients of the foreign variables in contemporaneous and 
lagged form. Deterministic components can include intercepts and linear time trends. 
Finally, uit is a vector of ki serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic shocks with zero mean 
and nonsingular covariance matrix. If autocorrelation patterns exist, further lags are 
added to the VARX. Shocks are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated, both 
across the equations for a specific country and across countries. International spillovers 
can arise due to a contemporaneous impact of the foreign on the domestic variables, 
through a dependence on global variables and through the contemporaneous correlation 
structure of the shocks. 
The foreign variables are country-specific. To construct the series, the weights might be 
chosen in line with bilateral trade flows (Dees, Di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith, 2009). As 
an alternative, Vansteenkiste (2007) suggested weights based on the geographical dis-
tance between the regions, and Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2007) used weights from 












where the weights wi,j add to unity and wi,i is equal to zero. The weights could also be 
time-varying as long as they are predetermined. This could be particularly important in 
the case of rapidly expanding emerging economies with fast changing trade relations to 
the rest of the world. Before the full system can be specified, each VARX is consis-
tently estimated on separate grounds. The foreign variables are treated as weakly exo-
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 geneous with respect to the parameters of interest. In the context of cointegrated mod-
els, the weak exogeneity assumption implies no long-run feedback from the domestic to 
the foreign variables, i.e. the error correction term is not significant for the latter series 
(Juselius, 2005). This does not rule out lagged short-run feedback between the two sets 
of variables. The weak exogeneity restriction can be tested in the context of the individ-
ual models. 
Once the VARXs have been estimated, all variables need to be solved in a simultaneous 
manner. By grouping the domestic and foreign variables, the country specific VARs can 
be stated as 
(3)    ,, 0 , 1 , 1 AB i it i i i it it zaa t z u − =++ + ,
where 
,0 ,1 * A( I , ) , B( , ) , =
i
it
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holds the variables gathered from all countries in the system. The model can be rewrit-
ten in terms of the x-vector by using the identity 
(4)  , zW it i t x =  
where Wi is the (ki+k
*
i)xk link matrix obtained from the country specific weights. The 
GVAR arises from the VARXs 
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Provided that G is nonsingular, the model (5) can be solved for xt. The dynamics of the 
system are explored by impulse response analysis and variance decompositions. These 
tools ars considered in a generalized form, i.e. they are invariant to the ordering of vari-
ables and countries (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Even if a suitable ordering of the vari-
ables in a VARX might be taken from economic theory, it is not clear how to order 
countries in the GVAR. 
 
4 Structural  macroeconometric  models 
Besides the GVAR, evidence is obtained on the grounds of two leading structural global 
macroeconometric models, namely the NiGEM (National Institute for Economic and 
Social Research, 2011) and the OEF model (Oxford Economic Forecasting, 2011). Al-
though the models differ in detail, they share some basic properties. Both are designed 
for forecasting and policy simulation. Because of the forecasting issue, the equations are 
fitted to historical data. Individual country models are interlinked via several channels, 
like trade, commodity prices, asset holdings and associated income flows, exchange and 
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 interest rates. Forward looking agents are assumed especially in financial markets, but 
this depends on the particular specification. 
The general structure is similar across countries, more or less. Potential GDP results 
from a Cobb Douglas or CES production function with labour augmenting technical 
progress. Technical progress is taken as exogeneous for the advanced economies, but 
for catching up economies, it might also depend on FDI. The production function con-
stitutes the theoretical background for the specification of the factor demand equations 
for employment and capital. Firms bargain with workers over wages, and choose the 
extent of labour conditional to output and real wages. In equilibrium, real wages move 
in line with productivity. A rise in unemployment has a dampening effect on real wages, 
implying that they fall relative to their trend. Inflation is inherently a monetary phe-
nomenon in the long run. Monetary policy sets the short term interest rate to achieve its 
target. In particular, interest rates move up if inflation is above the desired level and/or 
output is above potential. Actual GDP is equal to the sum of the demand aggregates. 
Private consumption depends on real disposable income, real financial wealth, real in-
terest rates and inflation. Investment of firms is affected by the capacity utilization and 
Tobins q, i.e. investment rates are affected by their opportunity costs, after taking taxes 
and allowances into account. Exports are a function of world demand and the real ex-
change rate, where a world trade matrix ensures the fulfillment of adding-up constraints 
across countries. Imports are driven by real domestic demand and measures of competi-
tiveness, such as relative unit labour costs or relative prices. Disequilibria between sup-
ply and demand are temporary and are represented by the output gap, i.e. the difference 
between actual and potential GDP, expressed as a percentage of the latter. The output 
gap is relevant for price adjustment, jointly with unit labour costs and import prices. 
10 
 Government spending and revenues depend on the state of the business cycle. For pol-
icy analysis, tax rates are treated as exogenous. 
Due to the nonstationarity of most variables, the equations are usually specified in error 
correction format with suitable dynamics around the long run. The long run is either 
specified on theoretical grounds or estimated in advance. Both model alternatives are 
implemented as simultaneous equation systems. To exclude spillovers arising from huge 
errors in individual relationships, estimation is done equation by equation. An instru-
mental variable approach is used to control for endogeneous right hand side regressors. 
Interdependencies within a country and across countries are taken into account after 
estimation is done. Once the regression parameters are determined, the whole system is 
solved by simulation methods. 
 
5  Impact of a Chinese shock 
The GVAR model comprises equations for real GDP and CPI inflation. To capture in-
ternational spillovers arising through financial markets, real equity prices, real exchange 
rates, nominal short and long term interest rates are also embedded on a country-by-
country basis. In each equation, the domestic variable is explained by its own lags, lags 
of the other variables of the system and lags of the foreign variables. The latter enter as 
an aggregate, with weights reflecting the relevance of the individual countries as trading 
partner for the domestic economy. Provided that the series are nonstationary, the equa-
tions are specified for the differenced variables, with error correction terms for the level 
variables included. All lag parameters are chosen in line with the Schwartz information 
criterion. The data are taken from the usual sources, such as the International Financial 
11 
 Statistics from the IMF and Datastream. Quarterly series are seasonal adjusted, and the 
observation period is from 1979Q1 to 2009Q4. The fiscal stimulus (3.1 and 2.7 percent 
of GDP in the first and second year) is implemented by respective GDP shock. The ex-
pected effects are obtained from the generalized impulse response analysis. In the struc-
tural models, the difference to the baseline scenario, i.e. the development without any 
additional measures is considered. See Table 1 for the impacts on GDP growth and Ta-
ble 2 for the inflation response. 
 
-Tables 1 and 2 about here- 
 
The Chinese GDP is expected to rise because of the shock. Due to the acceleration in 
demand, CPI inflation is also affected. Actual output exceeds its potential, thereby caus-
ing additional inflation pressure. The size of the latter effect is estimated rather impre-
ciely, with results ranging from slightly below one percentage point in the GVAR and 
OEF to almost three percentage points in the NiGEM specification
2. The impact on in-
flation increases over time, indicating some degree of price stickiness. Overall, these 
estimates imply that a substantial part of the current inflation experience in China is 
attributed to domestic forces. 
Regarding the international transmission of the shock, business cycle spillovers can be 
substantial, at least according to the GVAR and NiGEM environment. In contrast, they 
can be neglected in the OEF model. However, these results might be downward biased 
due to the low integration of China in the initial years of the sample period. According 
                                                 
2 The GVAR results have been derived with the toolbox provided by Smith and Galesi (2011), version 
1.1. 
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 to the GVAR and NiGEM specification, the GDP response is relatively high in Asia. 
Output growth in Japan rises up to one percentage point, reflecting higher export oppor-
tuinities of Japanese firms. See also Figure 1 for the GVAR impulse responses for GDP 
growth and CPI inflation. Therefore, China could trigger economic growth in the re-
gion
3. Furthermore, the GVAR reveals a remarkable acceleration of GDP growth in the 
US and the euro area, especially in the second year. However this effect is not robust. 
The reactions will decrease in the NiGEM model, with a negative multiplier in the US. 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
The latter reaction can be partially linked to differences in the inflation response. While 
the rise in inflation is only minor in the US and the euro area in the GVAR, the reaction 
is more pronounced in the NiGEM specification. Private consumption will decline, as a 
reduction in the purchasing power of households is implied. Global inflation increases 
because of higher prices of products imported from China. This size of this effect de-
pends on the extent to which Chinese products can be substituted. The lower the respec-
tive elasticities, the higher the impact on inflation. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The integration of China into the global economy is one of the most spectacular events 
in economic history. In three decades, China transformed from an agricultural country 
                                                 
3 The impact on other countries such as the ASEAN states is also quite high. Results are not shown in the 
tables, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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 to the second largest economy in the world, with a share of 10 percent of global GDP 
(PPP). This paper investigates to what extent this process affects output growth and in-
flation in the advanced countries. A GVAR model is specified to explore interdepend-
encies between business cycles in China and industrial countries, including the US, the 
euro area and Japan. For robustness, the results are compared to those obtained from 
leading structural models, such as NiGEM and OEF. Evidence is based on the responses 
to a Chinese demand shock arising from the recent fiscal stimulus program. The results 
reveal that the impact on output growth in the advanced economies can be quite sub-
stantial, especially for the Asian region. The expansionary effects in the US and the euro 
area responses are lower, as trade linkages are less intensive. The multipliers will be 
also reduced by a sizeable effect on inflation, as Chinese firms participate in interna-
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 Table 1: Responses of real GDP to Chinese demand shock 
 GVAR  NiGEM  OEF 
China  3.4 | 3.7  3.0 | 2.7  3.1 | 2.9 
Japan  0.6 | 0.7  0.9 | 0.4  0.0 | 0.0 
US  0.4 | 0.7  0.2 | -0.3  0.0 | 0.0 
Euro area  0.3 | 0.5  0.3 | 0.2  0.0 | 0.0 
Note: Responses to the fiscal stimulus program in China. Left (right) entry: Cumulated response after the 
first (second) year. Differences expressed as percentage points from the baseline. 
 
Table 2: Responses of inflation to Chinese demand shock 
 GVAR  NiGEM  OEF 
China  0.5 | 0.8  1.3 | 2.7  0.2 | 0.8 
Japan  0.3 | 0.5  0.1 | 0.4  0.0 | 0.0 
US  0.0 | 0.2  0.2 | 0.6  0.0 | 0.0 
Euro area  0.0 | 0.1  0.2 | 0.5  0.0 | 0.0 
Note: Responses to the fiscal stimulus program in China. Left (right) entry: Cumulated response after the 
first (second) year. Differences expressed as percentage points from the baseline.  
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 Figure 1: GVAR generalized impulse responses 
GDP growth 
   
   
 
CPI inflation 
   
   
Note: Dotted lines denote 90 percent confidence bands. 
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